IN RE BABY M: THE STRUCTURE
OF THE OPINION
Richard E. Brennan*
Much has been written, and will be written, about the celebrated opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Baby M.'
Much will be said about the legal doctrines contained in the opinion, about whether the conclusions arejustified or not, and about
whether or not the opinion is a genuine contribution to our
jurisprudence.
The purpose of my comments is not to add to the reams of
paper dedicated to a substantive analysis of the Baby M opinion.
Rather, from the perspective of a practicing attorney in the field
of domestic relations litigation, I shall attempt to give an overview of the opinion from the viewpoint of structural integrity and
logical composition. I shall leave it to others to assess the substantive correctness of this most provocative decision.
From a structural viewpoint, the opinion is an excellent one.
Indeed, it is the kind of opinion that lawyers love to receive and
read, especially in their own cases, because there is no doubt
whatsoever, right up front, as to the holding of the court. One
does not have to wade through pages and pages of turgid and
impenetrable prose to get to the holding of the opinion as is the
case with so many opinions of the appellate courts. I congratulate Chief Justice Wilentz for the terseness and succinctness with
which he capsulizes the court's holding in less than two pages of
the opinion.
Indeed, one need not go beyond the second paragraph of
the opinion in order to learn its expansive holding. As a convenience to the reader, I pause to set forth that all-important paragraph at length:
We invalidate the surrogacy contract because it conflicts
with the law and public policy of this State. While we recognize the depth of the yearning of infertile couples to have their
own children, we find the payment of money to a "surrogate"
mother illegal, perhaps criminal, and potentially degrading to
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women. Although in this case we grant custody to the natural
father, the evidence having clearly proved such custody to be
in the best interests of the infant, we void both the termination
of the surrogate mother's parental rights and the adoption of
the child by the wife/stepparent. We thus restore the "surrogate" as the mother of the child. We remand the issue of the
natural mother's visitation rights to the trial court, since that
issue was not reached below and the record
before us is not
2
sufficient to permit us to decide it de novo.
From that simple statement the entire opinion unfolds in
stages, each stage directly related to the correlative thought in paragraph two of the opinion. Indeed, paragraph two, which I consider
the key of the opinion, could be used by future generations as a
table of contents to the entire opinion.
Apart from the structural integrity and logical framework of the
opinion, which seems to evolve more like literature than legal writing, the opinion evidences a traditional approach to new and perplexing problems. The Chief Justice and the associate justices of
the New Jersey Supreme Court clearly recognized the challenging
and heretofore unaddressed problems which were generated by the
appeal. However, rather than taking an avant garde approach to
these novel issues, the court wisely adopted existing case and statutory law to the matters in dispute.
With respect to the validity of surrogacy agreements, the court
in very simple but unmistakable language branded them as unenforceable. Yet, on a parallel track, the court allowed for the possibility that voluntary surrogacy agreements, without the payment of
money, could be valid. Of course, it requires no great insight to
realize that there would be few if any takers under these circumstances. Therefore, the practical effect of the court's opinion is to
sound the death knell to all surrogacy agreements, whether supported by monetary consideration or not.
And this is another indication of the direct and simple approach
taken by the court. It flat out invited the legislature to act in this
troubled area. Of course, whether or not the legislature accepts the
challenge is problematical.
The entire opinion is characterized by the expression ofjudicial
antipathy to the concept of paying money to acquire a baby. That
the entire surrogacy arrangement smacked of commercial overtones
is repeatedly mentioned by the court. One such instance is the observation by the court, probably unnecessary to the ratio decidendi,
2
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that both William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead came together
because they responded to advertising by the Infertility Center of
New York.' Furthermore, lest the court be accused of being overly
protective of Mary Beth Whitehead (as some observers have noted),
the court clearly balanced the alleged altruism of Mary Beth in-purportedly wanting .to give another couple the gift of life by tersely
stating that it is clear that she also wanted the $10,000! 4
A disturbing inconsistency in. the opinion, however, is found in
the initial observation by the court that all parties were .acting in
good faith.5 Yet the court later spoke of the fact that both parties
clearly acted with an intent to circumvent this state's adoption laws. 6
This seems to be the only structural inconsistency in the entire opinion and, it is submitted, it is rather minor.
The lay press has characterized the supreme court opinion as
being overly critical of the trial judge. I do not find this to be the
case at all. Indeed, there are portions of the opinion in which the
supreme court was very complimentary of the trial court's handling
of this most difficult and perplexing case.
The court took a balanced approach to the issue of the respective character and fitness of the Sterns and Mrs. Whitehead. The
supreme court pointed out that each parent had something to bring
to Baby M, and that this would be the focus of a hearing on remand
with respect to the issue of visitation.. While-the court did seem to
gloss over the fact that Mary Beth had violated court orders by fleeing the state with the child during the early phases of the litigation,
the court clearly stated that this was not a dominant or controlling
factor.
The court's traditional approach to the case is manifest in all
areas of the opinion. In invalidating the basic surrogacy contract,
the court applied well-established statutory and case law prohibiting
the exchange of money with respect to adoptions. The opinion is
supported by ample precedent for the proposition that while private
adoption placements are legal, they are very much disfavored by the
law and require intense judicial scrutiny.
A possible criticism of the court's opinion is its inordinately
lengthy treatment of the concept of an illegal adoption. The theme
is repeated often during the opinion when it really had to be said
only once. The court said all that had to be said, it is submitted,
3 Id. at
4 Id. at
5 Id. at
6 Id. at
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when it pointed out that William Stern paid Mary Beth Whitehead
money for an adoption, not for her personal services. While unduly
long, however, there is a parallel benefit from this explication of
New Jersey law on adoption: it is a virtual restatement of the law on
the topic and may serve to obviate long hours of research with respect to the law of adoption generally.
With respect to the termination of Mary Beth's parental rights
by the trial court, the supreme court found that no reason in the
record existed for such drastic action. The court pointed out that
the "best interests of the child" criteria are not enough to terminate
the rights of the natural parent.7 This is a good, concise statement
of the law of termination of parental rights and it is a great practical
value to the bench and bar because it collects virtually all of the
precedents into one opinion.
The court wisely avoided most constitutional issues, and decided those which it did on very narrow grounds. The court complied with the time-honored practice of avoiding constitutional
issues wherever possible. While a whole panoply of constitutional
rights were raised by both parties to the appeal, the two basic rights
discussed by the court were William Stern's right to procreate and
Mary Beth Whitehead's right to the companionship of her child.
The court, with unassailable logic, stated that William Stern's
right to procreate was in no way infringed. Indeed, the court
pointed out that he did father a child, and that therefore it was
wrong for him to claim that his right to procreate was violated.
Mary Beth was said to have the fundamental and constitutionally protected right to the companionship of her child. There was
no constitutional right in either party, however, to exclusive custody
of the child.
The court could have waxed eloquent and discussed the constitutional issue at unnecessary length. It chose not to do so, and I, for
one, applaud the decision. This opinion was not meant to be a law

review article, although it certainly rivaled most law review articles
in length. On the contrary, it was intended to be, and is, a logically
progressive and evolving exposition of the rights and duties of natural parents, irrespective of how that parentage was mechanically
achieved.
The traditional and practical approach was followed by the
court with respect to its approach to the custody issue. The court
7 The court stated that "the parents' interests must also be considered; but that
when all is said and done, the best interests of the child are paramount." Id. at 466,
537 A.2d at 1263.
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broke no new ground in concluding that the child would be better
off with William Stern as the primary custodial parent. This is
where the "best interests" test comes into operation, not with respect to the draconian remedy of termination of parental rights.
The court remanded for a plenary hearing on the issue of visitation.
This, of course, comports with pre-existing case law.
The court's opinion with respect to custody and visitation
makes clear that there is no real or discernible difference between
the situation of William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead, co-venturers in what was essentially a business deal, and the situation of formerly married and presently divorced spouses. The court makes
this crystal clear in its opinion, and properly so. Once the court
invalidated the surrogacy contract, the natural parents of a child are
in the same position vis-a-vis that child as if they were married when
the child was born, and subsequently divorced. This happens every
day of the week and is routinely handled by our matrimonial courts.
Indeed, this is precisely what has happened on remand to Judge
Sween in Bergen County for a visitation determination.
In conclusion, while the opinion does appear to be somewhat
too long, and although it is a bit melodramatic at times ("She had to
have her child")' the opinion is quite readable and easy to digest.
Could the opinion have said the same thing in virtually one
third its length? Probably. However, this was certainly a unique
case and the emotion and pathos it generated could not be expected
to be ignored by the New Jersey Supreme Court when it reviewed
the evidence anql constructed the opinion. In balance, the opinion
will live on as an example of clear, forceful, logical and impressive
legal writing by what is generally conceded to be the finest state
Supreme Court in this country.
8

Id. at 465, 537 A.2d at 1262.

